How many category x airports

Any passengers with specific queries about their individual flight should check with their airline for more detailed information. In line with the government announcement regarding all UK airports, electronic items larger than 16 x 9. These items must go into the hold and passengers are advised to liaise with their airline on how to facilitate this. This will only affect passengers flying into London Stansted Airport from these countries, and not any departing from here.

For more information, please visit here. In some cases this will be over ml. Individual containers of breast milk must hold no more than 2,ml.

Each container will need to be screened at the security point. Airport staff might need to open the containers to screen the liquids. A passenger may take prescription medication in containers over ml through security, provided that they have a prescription or doctor's note for the medication. The passenger may only carry through security the quantity of liquid medication that is required for their journey.

Passengers will be able to buy liquids including drinks and perfumes in duty free and other stores after security control, or on-board the aircraft. If they are sold in a special sealed bag, passengers must not open them before they are screened otherwise the contents may be confiscated at the security checkpoint. Food items and powders in your hand luggage can obstruct images on x-ray machines.

Your bags may need to be checked again manually by security. You can put these items in your hold luggage to minimise delays. Worried about queues? Book now to use our time-saving express lane at security. Information about what to do if you've lost your luggage. Answers to all the questions you have about travelling through the airport. My bookings. Flight Departures Flight Arrivals. Airlines Guides to Travelling New Routes. Checking-in Security. Passport Control Luggage Carbon Offsetting.

Duty Free. Fashion Men Women. At the Airport. Airport Lounges Shopping Restaurants. A principal consideration in the debate over the opt-out provision, and more generally, the debate over the appropriate federal role in aviation security, is the extent to which screening activities should be considered 'inherently governmental' functions to be carried out by federal employees.

While this issue was an implicit central theme in much of the debate over aviation security following the terrorist attacks of September 11, , it may be revisited by Congress in evaluating the merits of the opt-out provision. The issue is related to ongoing debate over the appropriate federal role in critical aviation functions that affect safety as well as the security of the traveling public. Some members of Congress advocated the need for direct government involvement in providing critical safety-related aviation functions during the debate over protecting air traffic controllers and other air traffic related functions from possible outsourcing to private entities.

However, the opposing viewpoint contends that the provision of air traffic services is a commercial enterprise and has been privatized in other countries, including Canada, Australia, and several European countries, as well as on a limited basis in the United States under the federal contract tower program and at non-federal air traffic control towers.

Other safety critical workers in aviation such as pilots, flight attendants, aircraft dispatchers, and aircraft maintenance workers are also the employees of private entities whose safety-related activities are regulated by the FAA at arms-length. Thus, numerous functions directly affecting the safety and well-being of passengers are carried out by private entities making it possible to conclude that such activities may not necessarily be inherently governmental in nature.

In the current environment of heightened concern over threats to homeland security, airport screening operations are considered by many to have a unique importance that is fundamentally linked to national security objectives. In fact, one key argument for the federalization of airport screening functions following the attacks of September 11, focused on the recognition by some that screening activities had been elevated to a level of strategic importance for homeland security.

That is, screening operations were seen as critical front line measures to prevent further terrorist attacks against aviation assets and the traveling public, as well as, to protect citizens and property from additional suicide hijackings using aircraft as weapons of mass destruction.

From the viewpoint of those advocating federalization of airport screening operations, screener positions are seen as having a critical role in homeland security that has been compared to the functions of customs and immigration officers, particularly at larger airports. Among many, there is an expectation that screening activities should be performed by government personnel. This sentiment appears to be reflected in public opinion.

Specific Office of Management and Budget OMB guidelines on identifying inherently governmental functions includes among the characteristics of such functions activities that significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons. In keeping with the current administration's agenda to encourage competitive sourcing when appropriate, a stringent interpretation of what functions are considered inherently governmental has been adopted.

From the Administration's standpoint, the determination that aviation security screening functions are not inherently governmental has already been made and is consistent with the current use of private screeners under the private screening pilot program and the impending implementation of private screening operations under the opt-out provision of ATSA.

As of November 19, , that exemption will no longer be extended to security screeners at airports seeking to use private screeners because of the opt-out provision in ATSA. Therefore, a modification of existing statutes through legislation, either repealing or modifying the opt-out provision, would be required if Congress determines that maintaining a federal force of airport security screeners nationwide is in the best interest of aviation security. While the debate over whether operational functions such as passenger screening and air traffic control should be inherently governmental in nature is fundamentally linked to philosophical differences in opinion regarding the appropriate role of the federal government in operational aspects of aviation safety and security, there are two pragmatic considerations for evaluating whether privatizing screening operations are of potential benefit to the federal government.

These two considerations are: 1 the potential for cost savings, and 2 the elimination of conflicts of interest that exist when the federal government serves as both a service provider and a regulator of that service as is the case currently in airport screening operations and air traffic control.

Privatization advocates often cite the conflicting role of government entities serving in the capacity of both regulator and service provider as being inherently problematic from the standpoint of accountability. As such, the TSA is seen as having an inherent conflict of interest that may prevent deficiencies in its operations from being properly identified and corrected. A similar line of reasoning has been used to bolster the argument for privatizing air traffic controllers and other air traffic related functions within the FAA.

Privatization advocates argue that TSA's long term role should be focused on the following functions, leaving the day-to-day airport security operations in the hands of private security firms, as the opt-out program provides for:. However, a system of federal oversight over privately operated airport security system does not necessarily ensure better accountability of screening operations.

The federal government's ability to regulate and conduct oversight of private entities at arms-length has often been questioned, and adequate oversight is often resource intensive. For example, within aviation, deficiencies in the FAA's ability to provide adequate resources to oversee aircraft operators and maintenance repair stations has been identified in NTSB accident investigations 30 , Department of Transportation Inspector General's findings 31 , and GAO 32 probes.

These assessments have raised significant questions regarding the adequacy of FAA inspector staffing levels and training. Similar concerns over the FAA's ability to oversee security screening at airports were raised when the FAA had oversight authority of airline-managed screening operations. In response to these findings, the TSA contracted with the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency for contract support and oversight of private screening contracts prior to the full deployment of federal screeners.

While similar problems have not been observed with TSA's oversight of the pilot program contract operations currently in place at 5 airports, the adequacy of TSA's capabilities to monitor and audit contractor operations under the opt-out program may be an issue for congressional scrutiny.

This past experience indicates that developing a comprehensive plan for the oversight of private screening contracts under the opt-out provision will be important if private screening options are to be effective. In addition to overseeing the development of TSA's oversight plan for monitoring contract screening operations, Congress may also debate whether or not screening performance can be assured under a system of federally-managed contract screening operations.

If Congress determines that it is in the best interest to retain a federal force of airport screeners throughout the aviation system, then legislative action would be required to repeal the opt-out provision of ATSA.

A concurrent resolution H. This resolution contains language expressing the sense of Congress that all airport screening functions should be continued to be performed by federal employees. While this measure, if adopted, may encourage the TSA and airports to continue using federal screeners or discourage the pursuit of private screening options, it does not provide any statutory authority revoking or modifying the opt-out provision.

If it is believed that the opt-out program may be applicable only in specific situations, Congress may debate whether the opt-out provision should be statutorily limited in its scope. Congress may consider proposals specifically outlining the applicability of the program, and prohibiting outsourcing of screening operations outside of these defined applications. Congress may also consider proposals to establish stringent criteria for airports in order to be eligible for opting-out of the federal security screening program.

On the other hand, if Congress determines that it is in the best interest for aviation security to expand private screening options, it may do so in a variety of ways. One technique may be to offer specific incentives for airports to elect private screening options in lieu of federal screeners.

Another option that may be considered is increasing the statutory flexibility of the opt-out program through measures that would provide airports with more direct control over the management and oversight of security operations. Either of these options may work to increase the attractiveness of the opt-out program to airports. More aggressive options may include abandoning the opt-out provision, which currently requires each airport to submit a proposal to TSA for establishing a non-federal screening system at their airport, and instead establishing a comprehensive system-wide privatization program for airport screening at all commercial passenger airports.

While no formal proposals to expand the federal screening opt-out provision of ATSA have be offered to date, such options may be considered once further details of the opt-out program implementation are made available. One group of airports that may be able to utilize private screeners to implement passenger screening where there currently is none are those airports with infrequent commercial flights using small aircraft with 60 or fewer passenger seats.

While ATSA specifically requires pre-board screening of all passengers on air carrier flights, TSA's interpretation of this requirement has exempted certain airports that have a limited number of daily flights using these small commuter aircraft. Consequently, some of these airports do not currently have federal screeners. While these airports would seemingly benefit from private screening operations as a means to put in place cost-effective physical screening of passengers and their property, it is unclear if these airports would be eligible to apply for private screening under the opt-out program since TSA has exempted them from federal screening requirements.

Also, since funding for screening operations at these airports is currently not budgeted, additional budget resources would be required to implement private screening, or for that matter federal screening, at these airports. Congress may debate whether to explicitly include these airports without current federal screening operations among airports eligible for the private screening program, and examine the costs needed to conduct private screening operations at these airports where federal screening is currently not budgeted for or implemented.

Another potential benefit of private screening operations is that increased flexibility in staffing may make it possible to screen some or all airport workers at airports where screening of employees with access to secured areas is currently not conducted. While the specific security procedures for airport workers vary from airport to airport and are detailed in each airports security program, ATSA did not address the screening of airport workers and existing federal statutes do not require the screening of these individuals, even if they work in secured airport areas or have access to aircraft.

ATSA only requires that these individuals undergo a fingerprint-based criminal history records check. Some Members of Congress have raised concerns over the practice at some airports of allowing workers to bypass screening checkpoints and enter secured areas through employee access points where they only have to show their airport worker identification.

This could be done independent of the screening of passengers by private screening firms under the opt-out provision. However, the cost of implementing such a program, which is likely to come directly out of an airport's operating budget, would likely make this option unattractive to many airports. If airports are able to leverage funds for private screening under the opt-out program through savings obtained from more flexible staffing of checkpoints, reduced overhead costs, and so on, then airports may be able to carry out full or random screening of airport workers with access to secured areas of the airport while minimizing the cost associated with screening airport workers.

Another proposal that has been suggested by airport trade organizations is the use of a combined screening force consisting of both federal screeners and private screeners.

Additional flexibility in scheduling private screeners may allow airports choosing such an option to address unique demand characteristics, such as high volumes of seasonal traffic, with part-time or seasonal screeners. While the opt-out provision does not appear to preclude such an arrangement, the TSA and airports may seek clarification from Congress whether a mixed-model of private screeners working alongside federal screeners is in keeping with the intent of the opt-out provision.

Airport Liability Risk. One issue raised by airports is their potential liability under the opt-out program. The question of liability remains unclear and may need further clarification through legislation. In essence, an airport that requests private screening would have an indirect role in implementation of private screening.

The level of direct involvement of the airport authority would largely depend on the specific manner in which the opt-out program is implemented and the details of any specific proposal offered by a airport authority under the implementation framework established by the TSA. Some airports may seek minimal involvement, whereas other airports may want to directly manage screening operations. While the degree of liability for screening failures may reflect the degree of direct involvement that an airport has in screening operations, this may not necessarily be the case.

Also, it is unclear whether simply requesting private screening under the opt-out program would introduce a liability risk for an airport. This may depend, in part, on the level of specificity regarding private screening operations that will be required from airports by the TSA.

A greater level of specificity may expose airports to greater liability risk if details of the proposed program are implemented an can be shown to have resulted in screening deficiencies. The extent of liability exposure of an airport operator under the opt-out program is somewhat speculative since few details of the program are available.

However, airport operators are likely to weigh liability risk, as well as the availability and cost of insurance to guard against such risk, heavily in their decision whether to pursue private screening under the opt-out provision. Airports may seek specific liability protections from Congress, although no formal proposals to amend the private screening opt-out provision to address liability protection have been offered to date. Exclusion of Foreign-Owned Security Firms.

One concern over the opt-out program is the statutory requirement that security screening providers under the provision be U. This measure was presumably included in response to perceived inadequacies of airport screening firms identified in the aftermath of the September 11, attacks. Several of the largest airport security firms in operation at the time were foreign controlled. The Reason Foundation concluded that the current array of U. As the opt-out program evolves, it is likely that these existing U.

However, there may be other reasons why Congress may reconsider the prohibition on foreign ownership of security screening entities under the opt-out provision. Some privatization advocates have criticized the restriction on foreign ownership as being inconsistent with free trade principles and possibly with international trade agreements. Futhermore, many of these firms have extensive experience in aviation security that can be brought to bear in implementing private screening under the opt-out provision.

Consequently, some privatization advocates have proposed an option to amend the opt-out provision to allow participation by firms owned by nationals of U. Private Screener Employment Rights and Benefits. Both the opt-out provision and the security screening pilot program specify that private screeners are to be compensated and provided with other benefits that are at least equivalent to that received by federal screeners. However, some Members of Congress have raised concerns over apparent differences between benefits for most contract screeners in the private pilot screening program and their federal counterparts.

At the other four private screening pilot airports, screeners are only eligible to participate in a k plan, and do not have a defined-benefit pension plan in addition to or in lieu of those k programs.

Some Members of Congress have asked the TSA to look into the specific benefits offered to private screeners to ensure that statutory obligations are being met, and if not, to correct any deficiencies. Another issue that may be debated in Congress is the potential impact of organized labor and collective bargaining activities on private screening operations. While collective bargaining rights are given to most federal employees, TSA screeners may not join labor organizations or engage in collective bargaining activities.

Title 5, U. The Homeland Security Act of , in establishing the Department of Homeland Security, established a new human resources management system for the department to be more flexible and responsive to meeting unique homeland security needs. However, in defining this new system, statutory requirements specifically stated that the system shall "ensure that employees may organize, bargain collectively, and participate through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which affect them.

The TSA determined that "mandatory collective bargaining is not compatible with the flexibility required to wage the war against terrorism" and, based on this assessment, issued an order precluding collective bargaining by TSA screeners. AFGE has filed an appeal with the U.

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. While a final determination as to whether federal screeners may join labor unions and engage in collective bargaining is presently a matter under review by the federal courts, the role of organized labor in private screening operations under the opt-out program may be an issue of particular interest to Congress. The TSA does not have any apparent statutory authority to prohibit private screeners under the opt-out program from unionizing and engaging in collective bargaining practices with their contract screening firm employers.

Rather, the specific TSA authority to develop standards for hiring and retaining security screeners appears to apply only to federal screening operations. The TSA's conclusion that the presence of organized labor and the need for collective bargaining actions are incompatible with the need for a flexible screening workforce may conflict with the possibility that private screeners could be unionized under the opt-out provision. The TSA may seek legislative action from Congress to broaden its authority to include setting employment standards for private screeners as well as for federal screeners.

On the other hand, Congress may debate whether federal screeners, as well as private screeners, should be allowed to join unions and engage in collective bargaining as their private screening counterparts will presumably be able to do under current statute. This issue may rise to significance as the opt-out program evolves, particularly if morale and esprit de corps among federal screeners declines because of a perceived imbalance in their employment rights compared to private screeners.

The potential for such an effect may be heightened if combined screening forces are implemented at some airports resulting in unionized private screeners working alongside federal screeners who are prohibited from unionizing. In order to examine the relative cost and effectiveness of private screening, ATSA contained a provision establishing a pilot program using private screeners at five airports.

Under the provision, one airport from each security risk category was selected from the pool of airports that had applied to participate in the pilot program. The five airports selected are listed in Table 1. Table 1. Airports in the Security Screening Pilot Program. The TSA recently contracted with Bearing Point and Abt Associates to develop a comparative assessment technique and conduct a formal evaluation comparing airports in the private screening pilot program to airports with federal screeners.

However, the implementation of the private screening program has not been without criticism. This criticism points to perceived flaws in the pilot program that may limit the conclusions that can be drawn from this ongoing evaluation. First, the limited scope of the pilot program raises concern that inferences drawn from comparing these five airports to other airports under the federal screening system may not truly represent differences between private screening contracts and federal screening operations, but may simply reflect airport specific characteristics unique to the sites chosen for the pilot program.

Five airports represent only about one percent of the total number of U. So, in essence, the sample size for evaluating the effectiveness of private screening is only one data point per risk category. Moreover, the selection of airports was not done randomly.

Rather, selections were made from airport who voluntarily elected to apply for private screening under the pilot program. Therefore, there was no process to select a representative sample of airports for participation in the pilot program. Because of the limited scope of the pilot program, observations and statistical conclusions regarding the program are open to criticism regardless of what they indicate.

As advocates for expanding the pilot program have pointed out, findings from the current pilot program may be skewed by confounding local factors for a given airport or a given security contractor and may not be representative of private screening operations in general. For this reason, an expanded pilot program, consisting of percent of commercial passenger airports, was originally advocated as a means for providing a more meaningful basis for evaluating private screening programs. This is not to say that assessments of the pilot program airports cannot reveal valuable insights and data to assist airports in identifying many of the pros and cons of private screening operations, and perhaps identify certain elements of private screening operations that may be useful in developing proposals for participation in the opt-out program.

The pilot program airports may serve as insightful case studies for assessing private screening operations and comparing them to federal screening operations.

Also, to assuage some of the concerns over the potential for unique local factors confounding conclusions about specific private screening operations at the pilot program airports, the TSA-sponsored comparison study has matched the 5 airports to those airports using federal screeners considered to be most similar in security related characteristics.

The evaluation compared each of the five pilot program locations to 5 or 6 comparable airports where federal screeners are currently deployed. The comparison airports were selected from airports in the same security risk category that had available performance data such as covert testing data, and were selected based on their similarity to the pilot program airports on 15 variables reflecting passenger volume at security screening checkpoints, security staffing levels, airport configuration, and equipment types for checked baggage screening.

The pilot program locations and TSA screening locations used in the comparison study are listed in Table 2. Besides the small sample size, the pilot program, as implemented, has also been criticized because of its perceived lack of differentiation from TSA's federal screening practices that would allow a more robust comparison of alternative practices that may improve the efficiency of screening operations or reduce costs.

The committee noted that these five airports are required to operate at staffing levels and compensate their personnel using TSA policies and procedures, with little or no flexibility allowing for alternative scheduling or staffing models. The committee noted that using this methodology will not give Congress an adequate basis for comparing the cost and benefits of passenger screening by private security firms at these five airports to TSA screening at other commercial passenger airports.

The committee report directed the TSA to review this policy, and recommended that they provide the contract screener pilot locations as much operational flexibility as possible so that a more comprehensive assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of private screening approaches can be made.

Table 2. The TSA, in response, reiterated its policy of flexibility for new, innovative solutions to the existing private screening companies. However, the TSA maintains that the core security functions, such as training and procedures for carrying out searches of passengers and property, must be standardized across the entire system, and these are not subject to modification at individual airports.

TSA also reiterated its support for staffing initiatives such as split-shifts and reliance on part-time screeners when appropriate to better match staffing levels at security checkpoints to passenger demand. One example of a procedure implemented at San Francisco International Airport SFO is the use of skycaps with background checks to move checked baggage through the screening process, thus eliminating the need for screeners to handle the baggage thereby improving efficiency and throughput.

Despite these efforts, the GAO concluded that the TSA provided private screening contractors in the pilot program with only limited operational flexibility. Besides the aforementioned use of baggage handlers to improve the efficiency of baggage screening, the GAO also noted the use of assessment centers to pre-screen screener applicants, and the selection of screening supervisors from within the screener workforce rather than from TSA hiring assessments as additional examples of flexible operational practices.

Nonetheless, GAO concluded that the "TSA provided the screening contractors with little opportunity to demonstrate innovations, achieve efficiencies, and implement initiatives that go beyond the minimum requirement of [ATSA].

In general, the TSA-sponsored comparative evaluation of the PP5 program found few notable differences between private screening and federal screening. The evaluation compared private screening operations to federal screening operations in terms of effectiveness, cost, and customer and stakeholder impact. Airport Home. At the Airport. Cape Town International. King Shaka International. Bram Fischer International. Port Elizabeth International. Upington International.

East London Airport. George Airport. Kimberley Airport. Business Development. About the Company. Executive Management. Airline Services. Home » About » Security. What do you need to do? You may carry several containers with liquid contents. These containers must be packed in a re-sealable, transparent plastic bag. The total capacity of the plastic bag must not exceed one litre. It must be possible to open and re-seal the plastic bag.

These bags must be removed from your hand luggage and presented to security personnel for inspection.